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Comparative Law in a Time of Globalization:  Some 
Reflections 
Thomas C. Kohler* 
“Now it seems to some people that everything just is merely le-
gal, since what is natural is unchangeable and equally valid 
everywhere—fire, e.g., burns both here and in Persia—while 
they see that what is just changes from city to city.  This is not 
so, though in a way it is so.”1 
***** 
“There are, it is said, one hundred and fifty-four customs in 
France which possess the force of law.  These laws are almost 
all different in different places.  A man that travels in this 
country changes his law almost as often as he changes his 
horses . . . .  The Lord pity us!”2 
***** 
“The simpler the laws and the more general the regulations be-
come, the more despotic, arid and wretched a state becomes.”3 
I will use this happy occasion celebrating the work of Mary Ann 
Glendon for some short reflections on some ancient questions that 
have appeared in a new guise, and upon which analysis from a 
comparative perspective can shed some light.  The problems strike 
at the heart of the very idea of law itself.  Is law merely conven-
tional, a set of local, customary (and thereby divergent) practices, 
whose legitimacy or reasonableness is implied from long use?  Or, 
  
 * Concurrent Professor of Law and Philosophy, Boston College Law School. 
 1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 [1134b 25] (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 
Publishing 1985) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 2. FRANÇOIS-MARIE AROUET (VOLTAIRE), A Philosophical Dictionary, vol. IV (“Cus-
toms-Usages”) in VIII THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE:  A CONTEMPORARY VERSION (William F. 
Fleming trans., 1901). 
 3. JUSTUS MÖSER, Der jetzige Hang zu allgemeinen Gesetzen und Verordungen ist der 
gemeinen Freiheit gefährlich [The Current Tendency to Universal Laws and Administrative 
Regulations is a Danger to Common Freedom] (1772) in 5 JUSTUS MÖSERS SÄMMTLICHE 
WERKE:  HISTORISCHE-KRITISCHE AUSGABE IN 14 BÄNDEN 22, 23 (1943). 
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can only a norm universally recognized and applied enjoy the sta-
tus of being law? 
A brief address given by Professor Glendon at a small confer-
ence held in Florence in June of this year, in which we both partic-
ipated, triggered these ruminations.  In the course of her remarks, 
entitled, “The Adventure of Comparative Law,” she noted that, 
until recently, American lawyers had precious little interest in 
foreign law.  However, with the advance of globalization, the situ-
ation has changed.  American law schools, she observed, have 
quickly expanded their international programs.  Today, any law 
school worth its salt has offerings in international business law 
and public international law.  Nevertheless, she remarked, it is 
not clear what role, if any, comparative law will have in this new 
atmosphere.  Becoming a comparatist, she points out, involves 
some rather heavy and sustained lifting:  “Just as it takes consid-
erable investment of time and effort to acquire a working 
knowledge of one’s own legal system, it takes similar investment, 
and additional years of study, to become familiar with that of an-
other country, especially if other languages must be mastered.” 
Of course, the work involved in becoming a comparatist does not 
stop there.  Law mirrors a people’s history, values, beliefs, and 
culture, within and through which it seeks to deal with specific 
problems and crises in some normative way.  As students of our 
own law, we begin our work as beings steeped in our culture.  
Even if not well examined, as “natives” we bring to our undertak-
ing at least some aboriginal sense of the history and the shared 
meanings within which our legal system developed.  Perspectives 
from the human sciences, and perhaps particularly intellectual 
history and philosophy, play a crucial role in informing and deep-
ening our understanding of our own legal system, and assist us in 
developing a critical framework by which to evaluate the evolution 
and trajectory of our law and its specific doctrines.  No one, absent 
such work, could be considered a well-formed lawyer, but at best, 
a severely myopic technician. 
If such perspectives represent an important aspect of the study 
of one’s own law, they stand as an absolute requisite to even the 
most basic understanding of a foreign system.  By its very nature, 
comparative law constitutes an interdisciplinary undertaking, and 
one that is so at several levels.  As Lord Wedderburn has re-
marked of comparative work in labor law, “the language of a la-
bour law system can be learned only from its social history, above 
all the history of its labour movement.  Without a smattering of 
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that vocabulary comparative conversation is impossible.”4  His 
comments hardly restrict themselves to the labor field.  Successful 
comparative investigation in any area involves a wide and deep 
familiarity with another culture, and an ability to see how various 
aspects of the law and its historical development come together.  
The advice given by the great medieval scholar, Hugh of St. Vic-
tor, to students generally applies with special force to would-be 
comparatists.  “Learn everything,” he counseled, “you will see af-
terwards that nothing is superfluous.”5 
So, what distinguishes a comparatist from an internationalist?  
Perhaps one goes not too wide of the mark by answering, detail, 
and a lively sensitivity to and respect for the experiences, ideas 
and cultures of others.  International law constitutes, more or less, 
a closed and self-referential system.  By and large, it represents 
the creation of elites.  It tends to serve the needs of large, transna-
tional organizations that want uniformity and predictability and 
that typically have only tenuous particular or local ties, even to 
the increasingly powerless nation-states.  International law has 
developed its own norms at an abstract level, generating univer-
sals and prescinding from the creative if messy diversity of indig-
enous rules, doctrines and practices.  As a result, Glendon notes, 
“public international lawyers, international civil servants, and 
international NGOs are often impatient with, or even dismissive 
of, national differences.”  That from which an internationalist typ-
ically abstracts or ignores constitutes the core of the comparatists’ 
work. 
The tension between local ordering and the demand for a uni-
versal scheme based on “rational” principles is an old one.  In 
large degree, it congeals the arguments between the champions of 
the Enlightenment project who both proposed and imposed a new 
order, and its critics, such as Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocque-
ville, and Justus Möser, who is quoted at the start of these reflec-
tions.   
In response to the “geometrical and arithmetical” plans of “me-
chanics of Paris,” for example, Burke demanded of their authors, 
“do you seriously think that the territory of France, upon the re-
publican system of eighty-three independent municipalities (to say 
  
 4. Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Social Charter in Britain—Labour Law and 
Labour Courts?, 54 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991). 
 5. HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR, THE DIDASCALICON OF HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR:  A 
MEDIEVAL GUIDE TO THE ARTS 137 (Jerome Taylor trans., 1991).  “A skimpy knowledge,” he 
continues, “is not a pleasing thing.” 
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nothing of the parts that compose them), can ever be governed as 
one body, or can ever be set in motion by the impulse of one 
mind?”6  How could it be, he insisted, that “three or four thousand 
democracies should be formed into eighty-three, and that they 
may all, by some sort of unknown attractive power, be organized 
into one?”7  Not only do these small and varied institutions enable 
grassroots self-determination.  They also, Burke observed, gener-
ate the glue that binds people both within and across borders:  “to 
love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle 
(the germ as it were) of public affections.  It is the first link in the 
series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to 
mankind.”8 
In The Old Regime and the Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville 
notes that sometime during the middle of the Eighteenth Century, 
“a certain number of writers appeared who specialized in treating 
questions of public administration and to whom several similar 
principles have given the common name of economists or physio-
crats.”  They may have had less renown than the philosophes, 
Tocqueville states, but “it is in their writings above all that we can 
best study the Revolution’s true nature.”  “All the institutions that 
the Revolution was going to permanently abolish,” he continues, 
“had been the particular objects of the physiocrats’ attacks; none 
had found grace in their eyes.”9  “Whatever hinders their plans,” 
he observes, “is worthless” and “diversity itself is odious to them.”  
These theorists showed “themselves hostile to deliberative assem-
blies, to local and secondary powers, and in general to all the 
counterweights which had been established in different times, 
among all free peoples, to balance the central power.”  They de-
manded the abolition of anything “that disturbed the symmetry of 
their plans.”  “They were,” Tocqueville points out, “very favorable 
to the free exchange of commodities, to laissez faire or laissez 
passer in trade and industry, but as for political freedoms proper,” 
they demonstrated little or no concern.10 
  
 6. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 142 (Conor Cruise 
O’Brien ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1790). 
 7. Id. at 144. 
 8. Id. at 135. 
 9. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 209 (François 
Furet & François Mélonio eds., Alan S. Kahan, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1856).  
Tocqueville also notes that one of the physiocrats “proposed to eliminate at once all the old 
territorial divisions and to change all the provinces’ names, forty years before the Constitu-
ent Assembly did it.”  Id. at 210. 
 10. Id. at 210. 
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Examples of the tension that Burke and Tocqueville describe 
can be multiplied many times over.  The widespread displacement 
of local laws and customs through the “reception” of the Roman 
law throughout much of Europe during the late middle ages,11 or 
the imposition of the Code Napoléon in the Western German terri-
tories after the French-imposed reforms in the wake of 180612 pro-
vide just two further instances.  As Aristotle instructs us, howev-
er, diversity in laws and customs does not imply that all law is 
merely conventional or simply an expression of power and lacking 
in reason.  In the tradition that he represents, law constitutes an 
expression of practical wisdom, of what we might call prudence.  
As he also points out, prudent action depends on the circumstanc-
es, which vary just as reasonable responses to those circumstances 
may vary.  A number of approaches to a common problem may be 
equally sensible.  Circumstances change.  What does not is the 
operation of the normative person in being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible in making judgments about what to 
do in concrete situations.  The patterns of human experience vary, 
but the operations of human reason do not.  The old “internation-
alism,” as it were, focuses on the invariant operations of the per-
son in deliberating, valuing, and choosing.  The modern, in con-
trast, shifts the focus from persons and their reasonable opera-
tions to the rules themselves, emphasizing their abstract univer-
sality and uniformity. 
Of course, none of this denies the significance or the role of in-
ternational law.  It has assumed a quickly growing role, and its 
higher profile seems with us to stay.  Local does not necessarily 
mean good, and some matters, e.g., environmental concerns, often 
cannot be treated effectually on a local or even a national basis 
alone.  Moreover, efforts like the creation of the European Union 
inspire admiration and bear real promise, despite the various dif-
ficulties and complications that have attended it.  I simply want to 
point out that in a time of globalization, where the drive to uni-
formity and homogenization threaten to uproot and displace local 
orders and indigenous responses to problems, not to mention en-
tire cultures, insights from comparative law can play a usefully 
corrective role.  Comparative perspectives not only leave us with a 
  
 11. On this theme, see GERALD STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE:  THE 
OPPOSITION TO ROMAN LAW IN REFORMATION GERMANY (1986). 
 12. For a thorough and insightful treatment, see ELISABETH FEHRENBACH, 
TRADITIONALE GESELLSCHAFT UND REVOLUTIONÄRES RECHT:  DIE EINFÜHRUNG DES CODE 
NAPOLÉON IN DEN RHEINBUNDSTAATEN (1974). 
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greater appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of our own 
legal schemes.  Such perspectives also highlight the unique as-
pects and institutions of other systems, thereby alerting us to the 
costs of their being supplanted by transnational norms. 
One could undoubtedly pose a long string of examples of this 
sort of displacement and supplanting, but I find the decisions of 
the European Court of Justice in the highly controversial Viking13 
and Laval14 cases particularly poignant and illustrative.  Both 
cases deal with the collision between private, grassroots-level 
lawmaking between the parties through collective bargaining, as 
protected and structured by national law and the transnational 
legal scheme erected through the European Union.  These are 
somewhat complicated cases that raise a number of issues, and 
any extended discussion or analysis of them would be out of place 
here.   A short recitation may give a sense of threats and potential 
problems, however. 
In Viking, a Finnish company operated a ferry, the Rosella, 
which sailed under the Finnish flag and travelled between Fin-
land and Estonia.  The crew of the Rosella were members of the 
Finnish Seamen’s Union and covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Because Estonian labor costs were significantly lower, 
the company proposed re-flagging the Rosella in Estonia and en-
tering into a collective agreement with an Estonian union.  The 
Finnish union, with the support of the International Transport 
Workers Federation, which opposes re-flagging when the compa-
ny’s seat would remain in another country, took fully legal steps 
under Finnish law to boycott the Rosella and to employ other le-
gally sanctioned economic pressure.  As a result of this collective 
action, the company withdrew the proposal to re-flag its ship, but 
sought an injunction in an English court on the grounds that the 
unions’ actions breached Article 49 of the European Union treaty, 
which guarantees the “freedom of establishment,” i.e., the freedom 
to carry on business in EU member states.15 
  
 13. Viking Line ABP v. Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n, the Finnish Seaman’s Union, Case 
C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10779 [hereinafter Viking]. 
 14. Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenske Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-11767 [hereinafter Laval]. 
 15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
49 (ex EC Treaty art. 43), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 67 [hereinafter TFEU].  Arti-
cle 49 is supplemented by TFEU art. 56 [ex E.C. Treaty art. 49] 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 70, 
which guarantees the freedom to provide cross-border services.  It is not always clear under 
which Article activity might be protected or affected. 
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The much commented upon and criticized decision16 of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (“ECJ”)17 in this matter points in two di-
rections.  The Court first brushed aside contentions that questions 
dealing with workers’ associational freedoms, the right to strike 
and the right to impose other forms of economic pressure fall 
without the scope of EU law, in part because the extension of 
Community-protected economic freedoms would interfere with 
national social policy as embodied in national legal schemes.18  
Citing cases dealing with matters such as social security and taxa-
tion, the Court noted that even while legislating in areas that lay 
outside Community competence, enactments and regulations in 
these areas promulgated by member states had to comply with 
Community law.  The Court further made clear that the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provisions guar-
anteeing freedom of movement for workers,19 as well as freedom of 
establishment and the right to provide cross-border services, ap-
plied to unions as well as to state actors—the so-called “horizontal 
effect.”20  As Catherine Bernard points out,21 this ruling places un-
ions—private associations charged with the duty of protecting 
their members’ interests—in the same position as states and with 
  
 16. See, e.g., CATHERINE BERNARD, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW 202 n.75 (4th ed. 2012) (col-
lecting sources); A.C.L. Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?  The Viking and Laval 
Cases in the ECJ, 37 INDUS. L.J. 126 (2008).  For a concise analysis and critique from the 
perspective of German law, see Bertram  Zwanziger, Arbeitskampf- und Tarifrecht nach 
den EuGH Entscheidungen “Laval” und “Viking,” DER BETRIEB, Feb. 8, 2008, at 294. 
 17. Renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon and now known as the “Court of Justice of the 
European Union” (CJEU).  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art., 
May 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/01) 13, 22. 
 18. TFEU, art. 153, ¶ 5, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 114 provides that “[t]he 
provisions of this Article [dealing with the power of the Community to legislate or impose 
standards concerning the social rights of workers] shall not apply to pay, the right of asso-
ciation, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.”  These matters are reserved to 
national regulation. 
 19. TFEU, art. 45 (ex EC Treaty art. 39), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 65-66. 
 20. The Court stated that “according to settled case-law,” TFEU Articles 45, 49 and 56 
“do not apply only to the actions of public authorities but extend also to rules of any other 
nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment, self-employment 
and the provisions of services . . . .”  Viking, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10779, ¶ 33.  
“Since working conditions in different Member States are governed sometimes by provi-
sions laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by collective agreements and other acts 
concluded or adopted by private persons,” the Court explained, “limiting application of the 
prohibitions laid down by these articles to acts of a public authority would risk creating 
inequality in its application . . . .”  Id. ¶ 34. 
 21. BERNARD, supra note 16, at 204.   
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the same responsibilities, but leaves them unable to rely upon the 
defenses to decisions provided to states by TFEU Article 52.22 
Having ruled that unions would be governed by the same duties 
as states, the Court proceeded to recognize the right to strike “as a 
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law,”23 but then required that it be lim-
ited by the other economic rights stated in Community law.  As a 
result of this ruling, employers may challenge a union’s use of oth-
erwise legal economic pressure as infringing on an employer’s free 
movement rights.  Community law now trumps the underlying 
ordering scheme established by national law, at least in transna-
tional settings.  That point raises the question of threshold:  in an 
integrated economy, the parties to a dispute cannot confine the 
economic impact of strikes, boycotts, or other permissible economic 
pressure tactics solely to themselves.  How much economic impact 
does it take to turn a “local” dispute into one that has impermissi-
ble effects on another’s freedom of establishment or rights to offer 
cross-border services?  Could a third party, disadvantageously af-
fected by a strike or other union economic pressure, but not the 
primary object of it, nevertheless claim that its freedom to conduct 
business or to offer services across borders has been interfered 
with unlawfully? 
These questions aside, the union’s defense in situations like that 
in Viking will depend upon a judicial determination that its ac-
tions were justified and were proportionately exercised.  In other 
words, employee associations—unions—bear the burden of justify-
ing the use of any form of economic pressure.  Although a funda-
mental right, a strike appears to begin with the presumption of 
invalidity, and the unions bear the risk in employing it.  The 
standards for legality are rather hazy and the potential costs of 
misjudging how a court retrospectively will view the application of 
economic pressure are potentially high.  Nevertheless, the ECJ’s 
judgment betrays no sense of concern with the chilling effect its 
ruling may have on the exercise of what it recognized as funda-
mental rights.  It also ignores the fact, long recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court, that the ability to control the tim-
  
 22. TFEU, art. 52, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 69.  For a roughly analogous 
situation that placed a union in an invidious position by legally requiring it to represent a 
minority interest against the majority of its members, as embodied in the application of the 
neutral principle of seniority, see Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th 
Cir. 1980).  
 23. Viking, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10779, ¶ 44. 
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ing and the rationale for the use of economic pressure leads to the 
ability to control the outcome of industrial disputes.24  The ruling 
threatens to juridify considerably a process originally conceived of 
as autonomous norm-setting, one described by Gunther Teubner 
as a scheme of “reflexive” lawmaking.25 
In the Laval26 case, Laval, a Latvian contracting firm, won a 
contract to perform construction services on a school building in 
Sweden.  Laval posted thirty-five of its own workers from Latvia 
to work on sites operated by “Baltic,” a firm incorporated under 
Swedish law whose entire share capital was owned by Laval.27  
The posted workers were paid at rates substantially lower than 
Swedish construction workers. 
To protest Laval’s payment of sub-standard wages, and with the 
goal of having Laval adopt standards established by Swedish col-
lective agreements, Swedish construction trade unions picketed 
the worksite and employed other economic pressure tactics, all of 
which were in accord with and protected by Swedish law.  With 
the backing of the Swedish employers’ association, Laval success-
fully challenged the unions’ actions as a breach of the freedom to 
provide cross-border services under TFEU Article 56.  Confirming 
that Article 56 applied to unions as well as to states,28 the Court 
ruled that since Laval had paid its posted workers in accord with 
standards applicable in Latvia, any attempt to impose the stand-
ards applicable in a host state violated Article 56.29  The judgment 
  
 24. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
 25. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 
LAW & SOC. REV. 229 (1983).  Reflexive law refers to a scheme intended only to erect proce-
dural and organizational norms within which private ordering can occur.  The goal of such 
ordering is “regulated autonomy.”  Such a scheme also represents an expression of the 
subsidiarity principle.  Subsidiarity emphasizes self-administration by putting authority 
for decision-making at the lowest possible social or political level.  It also requires larger 
bodies to supply assistance (subsidium) where required to support the smaller body or take 
over tasks they cannot perform. 
 26. Laval, Case C-341/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-11767.  
 27. The Court dismissed arguments that because: 
the share capital of Laval and of Baltic were held by the same persons, and those 
companies had the same representatives and used the same trademark, they should 
be regarded as one and the same economic entity from the point of view of Communi-
ty law, even though they constitute two separate legal persons.  Therefore, Laval was 
under an obligation to pursue its activity in Sweden under the conditions laid down 
for its own nationals by the legislation of that Member State, for the purposes of the 
second paragraph of Article 43 EC. 
Laval, Case C-341/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 43. 
 28. Id. ¶ 95. 
 29. For further analysis of this case and its implications under EU law, see sources in 
supra note 16. 
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also analyzed the provisions and applicability of the Community’s 
Posted Workers Directive.30 
Laval and Viking illustrate the enormously strong undertow 
embedded in transnational schemes that act to de-tether and sup-
plant both national and more localized, grassroots systems of or-
dering.  They also exemplify the elevation of concern for the func-
tioning of efficient markets over political freedoms and self-
governance that Tocqueville had warned of in the plans of the 
physiocrats.31  In this, Laval and Viking do not stand alone.   
In its Schmidberger32 judgment, for example, the ECJ suggested 
that a duty could exist on the part of Member States to restrict 
constitutionally protected freedoms of expression and assembly 
when their exercise would disproportionately burden the funda-
mental right to the free movement of goods.  The Schmidberger 
Court stated that, “unlike other fundamental rights enshrined” in 
the European Convention on Civil Rights (“ECHR”), “such as the 
right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, which admit of no restriction, nei-
ther the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly guar-
anteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in 
relation to its social purpose.”33  Having concluded that rights to 
the free movement of goods stand on an equal footing with rights 
of expression and assembly, the Court balanced the interests.34  It 
found, on the facts of the instant case, that Austria had not in-
fringed Community law by failing to enjoin a citizen demonstra-
tion that closed the roadway through the Brenner Pass for about 
twenty-eight hours to protest the danger to public health posed by 
increasing heavy goods traffic through the Pass, and to persuade 
authorities to reduce traffic and pollution in that environmentally 
sensitive region.  Once again, it appears that any restriction on 
commercial activity such as the free movement of goods presump-
tively enjoys protection against interference, even if that interfer-
  
 30. Directive 1996/71/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Decem-
ber 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services, 
1997 O.J. (L 18) 1. 
 31. See text accompanying supra notes 9-10. 
 32. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, Case C-
112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659. 
 33. Id. ¶ 80. 
 34. While observing that “competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion,” the 
Court stated, “Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed 
upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective pur-
sued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights.”  Id. ¶ 82. 
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ence comes through the means of protected speech and assembly.  
The burden is on the Member State to demonstrate that its “fail-
ure to ban can be objectively justified.”35  If nothing else, the case 
spurs some interesting speculation, if not dark concerns, about the 
way the Court may strike the balance in the future. 
Manfred Weiss sagely but undoubtedly controversially observes 
that criticism of the Court for these decisions is unfair.36  The cre-
ation of the European Economic Community in 1957 aimed at the 
establishment of a common market.  Consequently, he points out, 
it comes as no surprise that the free movement of goods and capi-
tal and the freedoms of services and establishment constituted the 
cornerstones of the Treaty and its successors.  The Court, he ar-
gues, has little wiggle room, and out of considerations for its own 
legitimacy, it must work within the strict confines the Treaty es-
tablishes for it.  The question for the Court in Viking and Laval 
“was merely whether national law on industrial action was an un-
lawful restriction of the market freedoms of establishment, as 
guaranteed in the EC Treaty.”37  The Courts’ authority to balance 
rights or account for equities is, Weiss points out, quite limited:  
“the Court took the market freedoms and the fundamental rights 
as conflicting entities of equal value, trying to find a balance be-
tween them.”38  “The two judgments show the general dilemma 
resulting from the construction of the EU,” he states.  “Since the 
Treaty [TFEU] . . .  is still shaped according to the philosophy of 
promoting market freedoms as much as possible,” the Court has 
limited ability to engage in balancing, which in any event “only 
can be done by the Court incrementally.”39  Even if the Court’s “in-
terpretation of public policy derogations is rather restrictive,” 
Weiss observes, the Court finds itself confined by the “architecture 
of the Treaty.”40  Perhaps Tocqueville would not have been sur-
prised. 
We hear a great deal today about multiculturalism, but the 
trends associated with globalization appear headed much more 
  
 35. Id. ¶ 64. 
 36. Manfred Weiss, The Potential of the Treaty has to be Used to Its Full Extent, 2013 
EUR. LABOUR L.J. 24 (2013).  In light of the decisions in Viking, Laval, and some companion 
cases, Weiss states, “court-bashing has become a favourite sport of all those who do not like 
the outcome of these Court rulings.”  He states that “[t]his court bashing is based on a very 
narrow-minded and ill-founded perspective.”  Id. at 25-26. 
 37. Id. at 26. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 27. 
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strongly in a monocultural direction.  Just over a century ago, 
Max Weber resignedly warned that a deracinated and instrumen-
tal version of reason had come to dominate modernity, confining 
us within an “iron cage” wherein all aspects of social life have been 
progressively bureaucratized, and where relentless economic cal-
culation has flattened and displaced all previous “irrational” pat-
terns of living, while squeezing out all of the humane pleasantries 
that once characterized them.41  Caught between the large struc-
tures of market or state, human possibilities limit themselves to 
living, as Weber so pungently put it, as “specialists without spirit, 
sensualists without heart.”42 
Globalization in its present guise carries precisely this danger 
for human societies, since its illumination springs from just the 
ideas, forces, and embedded tendencies that Weber described.  The 
classic or pre-Enlightenment understanding described law as “an 
ordinance of reason made for the public good,”43 or in its form as 
the law embodied in the Corpus iurus, as representing “an unri-
valed model of natural and civil rationality, if not an expression of 
an authentic and immutable juridical metaphysics.”44  A growing 
demand for uniform, homogeneous international norms, justified 
by claims of their rationality (in the Weberian sense), predictabil-
ity, and as representing “best practices,” has accompanied the rise 
and spread of globalized trade, and transformed these understand-
ings fully.  Rather than acting as an autonomous architectonic 
structure designed to order social relations and to secure some 
rough version of human flourishing and the common good, law as 
we now know it increasingly functions simply as the handmaid of 
economic efficiency.  We regard norms that obstruct such “efficien-
cy” as irrational and illegitimate (and one should keep in mind 
that goodness and legitimacy are, at bottom, entirely different cri-
teria).   
The demotion and restriction of reason as representing merely 
the ability to calculate the most effective and economical means to 
an end necessarily has had a substantial impact on our under-
  
 41. On this point, see JOACHIM RADKAU, MAX WEBER:  DIE LEIDENSCHAFT DES 
DENKENS 32-33 (2005) (discussing Weber’s views concerning the effect of competition and 
market structures on family relationships). 
 42. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 124 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1905). 
 43. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. Ia-IIæ q. 90, art. 4 (Treatise on Law) 
(1274). 
 44. ALDO SCHIAVONE, THE INVENTION OF LAW IN THE WEST 15 (Jeremy Carden & An-
tony Shugaar, trans. 2012)  
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standing of the significance and role of the law.  It has other costs 
and carries with it other long-term tendencies as well.  “Instru-
mental reason,” Charles Taylor observes: 
has also grown along with a disengaged model of the human 
subject, which has a great hold on our imagination.  It offers 
an ideal picture of human thinking that has disengaged from 
its messy embedding in our bodily constitution, our dialogical 
situation, our emotions, and our traditional life forms in order 
to be pure, self-verifying rationality.45 
In a world increasingly fascinated with and dominated by “vir-
tual reality,” where many spend much of their lives in a sort of 
parallel existence, we easily can forget that we are embodied intel-
lects, conditioned by our moods and emotions, and the state of our 
“lower conjugates,” our biochemical, cellular, neural, and other 
physical systems that support and become sublated into our con-
scious life.  Since the time of Descartes, the tendency has existed 
to regard ourselves as pure mind, disengaged reason that exists 
apart from our scruffy clay shells.  However, as Eric Voegelin re-
minds us, our bodily existence forms the basis for our social exist-
ence.  “Human consciousness,” he observes, “is not a free-floating 
something but always the concrete consciousness of concrete per-
sons.”46  Voegelin warns that when we attempt: 
to liberate consciousness from man’s corporeality, there arise 
symbols of order like the realm of the spirits, or the perfect 
realm of reason to which mankind is approaching, or the 
withering away of the state and the coming of the Third Reich 
of the Spirit, or the realms of perfection that are expected as 
the result of the metastasis of man to a homo novus or a su-
perman, be it that of Marx or of Nietzsche.47 
We forget what we truly are only at great peril. 
Comparative approaches represent no panacea to these trends 
and dangers.  There is no magic about them.  Comparative law, 
however, offers an approach that puts the person back at the cen-
ter, in a cultural and historical context, one subject both to devel-
opment and decline, to intelligent responses as well as silly or 
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short-sighted regimes.  By paying attention to the diverse ordering 
solutions that communities have mounted, comparative law also 
can encourage an appropriate sense of intellectual modesty, one 
that warns us of the dangers inherent in attempts to erect model 
regimes that pay scant attention to the experiences of humans 
over time, and that ignore the cultures and concrete circumstances 
of others.  Done correctly, comparative approaches can help to 
shift the focus of our work from concerns with mere efficiency, 
from abstraction, from a forgetfulness of our full humanity.  In 
other words, by focusing our attention on the whole, it can help us 
re-engage with ourselves, and remind us that the real subject of 
the law is the human.  Today many celebrate “disruption,” the 
Rousseauian-tinged motto of the moment, and use it as something 
of a programmatic theme.  What could be more disruptive, at least 
of typically unexamined trends and ideas, than seeking to make 
law more human?  That task constitutes the role of comparative 
law in a time of globalization. 
 
